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Presidents, producers and politics: 
Law-and-order policy in Brazil from Cardoso to Dilma 
 
Despite being a middle-income democracy, Brazil has a serious and 
apparently intractable problem with violent crime, with nearly 60,000 homicides, that 
is, 10% of the world’s total. Its homicide rate is the 11th highest, at 32 per 100,000 
population (the world average is 6.7, and 3.8 in wealthy developed countries). This 
has steadily worsened since its return to democracy in the mid-1980s, and puts it out 
of step with a 16% drop in homicides globally over the last decade. Brazil’s 
institutional responses have followed the same upward trajectory. In 2014 it had the 
fourth largest prison population in the world with 622,000 inmates, up 575% from 
1990. Yet, the three countries above it have reversed their policies and decreases in 
their prison populations since 2008: the USA by 8%, China by 9% and Russia by 
25%. High levels of incarceration in Brazil have not reduced crime and insecurity. On 
the contrary, overcrowding, appalling conditions of detention, inadequate legal 
counsel, and other human rights violations have prompted inmates to form self-
defensive syndicates and gangs, and use their control of the prison system as a base 
from which to direct organized crime in the wider community (Dias and Darke 2016).  
Ineffective law-and-order policies not only cause anxiety to the general 
population, but also pose a threat to democratic legitimacy and functioning.
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 Yet, in 
Brazil, and other Latin American countries that have transitioned from authoritarian 
rule or civil conflict, presidents have been ambivalent about investing political capital 
in security and justice sector reform, and found it difficult to enact their policy 
preferences (Macaulay 2012a) . This article analyzes the governance tools available to 
three Brazilian presidents, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), and how successfully they 
used them to direct and enact policy to reduce crime, develop effective and 
accountable policing, and promote effective penal responses. It examines the common 
patterns, and the differences, in the ways that each approached their key roles as 
president: communicating with the public on the issues, using the agencies of the 
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 A survey published by Datafolha in conjunction with the Brazilian Forum on Public 
Security, published in November 2016, showed that 76% of the population feared 
being murdered. Some 55% fear police violence and 70% think the police use 
excessive force (Fórum Brasileira de Segurança Pública 2016) 
federal bureaucracy, managing intergovernmental relations with the subnational units 
(states and municipalities), and managing their multiparty coalition and relations with 
Congress.  
Coalitional presidentialism and producer capture 
The context for these complex roles is the specific configuration of 
governance in Brazil, coalitional presidentialism, where the president has to govern 
through a coalition of between three and ten or more parties (Power, 2010). This is 
required by a highly fissiparous, and therefore porous, party system, which in turn is 
the product of an open list electoral system, with the only bar to individual entry being 
sufficient finances or interest group support to run in large electoral districts. This 
article argues that this fragmented, easy-entry system has also facilitated producer 
capture in both the bureaucratic and legislative arenas, which has significantly 
impeded presidential effectiveness in this policy area. The term is generally used to 
denote the process by which the goals of an organization reflect the interests and 
prejudices of its employees (the producers) rather than those it is supposed to serve 
(the consumers, customers or citizens). Criminal justice institutions (police forces, 
prosecution service and judiciary) already tend to contain highly cohesive, organized 
professional groups with strong corporate identities. In the Brazilian case, this is 
exacerbated by the constitutionally enshrined hyper-autonomy of these groups. This 
resulted in resistance to reform imposed through legislation or policy initiative, as 
they repeatedly act as veto-players to protect what they perceive as their own 
professional interests.  
However, a second type of producer capture also occurred. As the party 
system fragmented further in the 2000s, direct representatives of criminal justice 
producers (mainly police officers) and indirect representatives of private security 
actors (politicians funded by these lobby groups) increasingly entered legislative 
arenas, principally the Chamber of Deputies, as agenda-setters. There they formed a 
cross-party alliance determined to radically change the direction of law-and-order 
policy in Brazil. To do so they joined forces with other cross-bench interest groups to 
form a significant counter-reform movement that contributed to the impeachment in 
2016 of President Rousseff. Thus, they ended up having the highest-level political 
impact – toppling the president – as well as taking reversing the policy direction set 




The character, ideology and power of the different contemporary stakeholders in the 
law-and-order field in Brazil have their roots, in part, in the military regime of 1964-
85. Although the federal government maintained centralized control over the security 
agencies, the latter enjoyed impunity and operational latitude. The state-level military 
and civil police forces, which were subordinated to the armed forces in pursuit of the 
repression of opposition movements, subversives and Communists, adopted their 
tactics of extra-judicial executions, death squad activity, and torture. Due to the 
prolonged and negotiated nature of the transition to democracy, controlled by the 
armed forces, which retained some institutional links to the police, there was no 
purging of police ranks, restructuring or retraining. Police reform was also not on the 
agenda during the drafting of the 1988 Constitution, which ended up enshrining some 
problematic provisions. Firstly, it prescribed that every state in Brazil should have 
both a military and a civil police force, the first for “prevention and repression” of 
crime, the second for the investigation of crime. This made the federated states both 
powerful and hard-to-influence actors in the delivery of law-and-order, lack of co-
operation between the two state police forces undermined the effectiveness of this 
delivery. Secondly, it left the Military Police (80% of the nation’s police forces) 
protected by the Military Courts, and thus ensured both impunity and a militarized 
conception of public security and policing that has not yet been overturned 
(Zaverucha and Melo Filho, 2004). 
The notion of “National Security” (protecting the nation from foreign 
ideologies) that prevailed during the military period changed, in the new democratic 
period, into one of “Public Security’, the term used in Brazil for law-and-order. The 
term implies the need to protect the state and those who occupy, control, and benefit 
from, the state apparatus from the threats posed by the populace and its behaviours 
(criminals, drugs users/dealers, the marginal classes). This concept also encouraged 
producer capture among the criminal justice agencies, as they both prioritized their 
own corporate interests over those of the citizens, and believed they were better at 
directing law-and-order policy than the politicians and legislators.  
 
Presidential roles in relation to law-and-order policy 
 
In relation to the amount of attention that recent presidents have given law-
and-order issues, a pattern of sorts has emerged. In both the Cardoso and Lula 
presidencies, public security was downplayed and sidelined in the first term (Soares 
2007; Adorno 2003). Neither president considered it a priority in policy and 
governance terms, and preferred not to spend finite political capital on it: Cardoso 
focussed on economic and governance reforms to help consolidate financial 
stabilization, whilst Lula was more interested in his poverty reduction agenda. But 
neglect of law-and-order created a ticking time-bomb that went off in events that 
forced them to attend to it in their second terms. For Cardoso it was a number of 
globally publicized episodes of police violence, whilst for Lula it was the show of 
strength of the prisoner syndicate, the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da 
Capital, PCC), in São Paulo state’s prison system, and on the streets of the state 
capital, in May 2006. The dynamic for Dilma was similar only insofar as she also 
neglected crime and policing issues in her first term, squandering a lot of the 
institutional impetus around justice sector reform accumulated in Lula’s second term. 
The street protests that erupted in June 2013 around the quality of public services 
were met with police repression, but her only major initiative on public security was 
the National Plan for Homicide Reduction announced in mid-2015, and promptly 
ignored by Michel Temer when he assumed the presidency (Datafolha and Fórum 
Brasileira de Segurança Pública 2015). During her embattled second term she faced 
unprecedented, organized opposition to the centrist, reformist consensus on law-and-
order set by the preceding PSDB and PT presidencies. 
The public role: presidential discourses on public security 
The three presidents faced similar challenges in terms of exercising their 
various roles in relation to policy, but each dealt with them somewhat differently. 
Two key “faces” of the president are those that they present to the world and to the 
nation. On law-and-order, all three preferred what Garland terms a denial and 
delegation approach. Crime and violence have ranked in the top three concerns of 
Brazilians since the mid-1990s, successive governments have faced criticism by 
regional and international human rights bodies, and Brazil’s levels of violence taint its 
international image. Yet these reputational and electoral hazard were not evident in 
presidential speeches or debates. These presidents were not penal populists and saw 
more electoral/political risk than gain in highlighting the federal government’s 
responsibility for citizen security. This they delegated to the federated states, which 
have operational responsibility for the criminal justice agencies in their jurisdiction, 
and spend around 80% of the national budget for the same. The Cardoso government 
put together a National Plan on Public Security only in 2000 in response to a 
notorious incident of violence,
2
 but it was more of a hurried wish-list than an 
implementable plan. Lula produced a similar plan as part of his electoral platform in 
2002, in the form of a100-page policy document, written by a team of leading experts. 
Yet after the election he soon downgraded the profile of this policy area, partly 
because his key appointee was drawing too much attention, and partly for purely party 
political reasons. Luiz Eduardo Soares, co-ordinator of the policy document and 
appointed head of the National Secretariat for Public Security, allegedly knew about 
the party’s kickback schemes in its local governments that were funding its illegal 
electoral war chest, and was demanding an investigation.  
For the first time the 2006 presidential debate saw the candidates (Lula and the 
PSDB nominee, Geraldo Alckmin) forced to debate crime and violence, following the 
PCC violence in São Paulo state, of which Alckmin was governor. In neither election 
campaign did Dilma address public security issues. Her opponents for the presidency 
preferred to attack her first on her political background and reproductive rights, then 
on management of the economy and the emerging corruption scandals. However, 
many candidates for the nation’s legislatures were running successfully on explicit 
law-and-order platforms and the relative reticence of these three presidents left the 
door open for political actors with a punitivist agenda to capture large numbers of 
votes, and key political spaces in Congress, enabling them to shape the terms of the 
debate and set the agenda This was expressed itself in a wave of tough-on-crime 
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 A bus was hijacked in downtown Rio de Janeiro, and the hostage situation was 
streamed live on television. 
legislation pushed through in 2015-16 by the same opposition mobilized for Dilma’s 
impeachment by Eduardo Cunha, the then Speaker of the House.  
 
Directing the Federal Bureaucracy: The Ministry of Justice  
A key presidential role in delivering policy is control of the federal 
bureaucracy, which includes the political factors that influence appointments, the 
amount of personal and political capital the president is prepared to expend on this 
policy area, and which other actors are competing for influence. For law-and-order 
policy the key agencies are the Ministry of Justice, its National Secretariat for Public 
Security (Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública - SENASP), and subsidiary 
bodies. Ministerial appointments have following a number of quite different logics. 
Unlike some other ministries, the post has not generally been regarded as “pork’, that 
is, as a reward for one of the parties in the president’s coalition, although a couple of 
appointments under Cardoso were likely for this reason. Nor is it a position regarded 
as requiring purely technical expertise, although all appointees under these three 
presidents had at least training in law, and most had professional experience as 
lawyers and legal professionals (Almeida 2016, 220). This Ministry is also expected 
to act as an important sounding board for the president, due to its interactions with the 
federated states, and so all three tended to choose trusted individuals from their own 
or closely allied parties, or from within the Ministry. That said, between 1985 and 
2002 ministers of justice lasted an average of just one year in the post, casting doubt 
on how effective they could have been as political fixers or, indeed, as policy-leaders, 
and on the level of political or policy importance attributed to this ministry.  
Despite the high overall turnover rate of Cardoso’s Ministers of Justice, he 
made some significant appointments. His first, and longest-serving minister, Nelson 
Jobim, was a seasoned politician who had played a key role in the constitutional 
drafting and negotiation process. He oversaw a number of key reforms, such as the 
national commissions to revise the criminal code, the criminal procedure code, and 
the law governing prison regimes and sentence-serving. However, two leading jurists 
with a reform agenda whom he appointed lacked Jobim’s political skills and the 
president’s political backing. Neither José Carlos Dias or Miguel Reale Jr had been 
Cardoso’s first choice and fell easily when they came up against entrenched 
stakeholders (the armed forces) or delicate inter-governmental relations (between 
federal and state governments).  
Lula’s ministerial appointments were more stable, combining political nous 
with technical interest in justice issues. They also engaged in institution-building 
within the Ministry which greatly strengthened governance capacity, creating a 
special secretariat for judicial reform and a unit to investigate the prison system, and 
boosting the secretariat for legislative affairs. Márcio Thomas Bastos, a well-regarded 
criminal lawyer who had been Lula’s personal counsel, lasted for more than a full 
mandate. He drove through a reform of the judiciary that the Cardoso government had 
allowed to drag on due to the lack of a clear policy vision on the part of the President, 
and to the power of producer groups in judicial institutions (Macaulay 2003). The 
reform package created an important new oversight body, the National Council on the 
Judiciary, which proved an important ally in confronting the collective resistance of 
judges to certain policy and legal changes. Tarso Genro, Minister through most of 
Lula’s second term, brought both an intellectual interest in the public security reform 
agenda, and the clout as a seasoned political heavyweight from within the PT to carry 
through the next stage of justice reforms.
3
 He relaunched Lula’s National Public 
Security Plan, a comprehensive, non-partisan, technical blueprint for joined-up state 
policy, whose cornerstone was a Unified Public Security System (Sistema Único de 
Segurança Pública - SUSP). This was intended to finally address the vertical and 
horizontal fragmentation of policing and public security by inducing greater 
operational co-operation between police forces, both horizontally at state-level, and 
between the three levels of government. However, resistance within the Ministry and 
Lula’s reluctance to lend full political backing in 2003 had prevented his first head of 
SENASP, Luiz Eduardo Soares, from implementing it.  
Dilma continued in this vein, appointing José Eduardo Cardozo, a former law 
professor, public prosecutor and politician, who had helped run her election 
campaign. But in office he had his hands dealing full with the fallout of the Lula years 
such as the mensalão trial (involving the government buying the votes of members of 
its coalition), the 2013 street protest, a tide of corruption investigations, and ensuring 
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 Genro was twice elected mayor of Porto Alegre, served as Minister of Education in 
the first Lula term, steered the party through the chaos of the corruption allegations of 
2005, and in 2010 was elected governor of Rio Grande do Sul. 
security for the 2012 World Cup and 2016 Olympics. As the law-and-order counter-
reform forces grew more organized in Congress, much of his effort was spent in 
rearguard actions, defending existing legislation. He was briefly replaced as Minister 
by senior prosecutor Eugênio Aragão, when Dilma appointed Cardozo Attorney 
General to mount an ultimately unsuccessful defence against her impeachment. 
Whilst the Ministry of Justice was not the site of party political dispute, its 
most important agency, SENASP, saw contestation between security sector 
stakeholders, particularly the armed forces and police. During the Cardoso years, 
three of the National Secretaries came from the armed forces and two from the police. 
Lula appointed just one (federal) police officer, and two civil society actors and a PT 
politician with area expertise, whilst Dilma appointed a technocrat. 
Despite the civilianization of the the Ministry of Justice, military (armed 
forces and police) actors remain in many strategic decision-making positions on law-
and-order policy at both federal and state level. Cardoso addressed the armed forces 
on two fronts, establishing civilian control over the Ministry of Defence, and 
removing them from direct control inside the Ministry of Justice, where they 
controlled the national crime database. Before he did, they toppled one of his Justice 
ministers, José Carlos Dias, who tried to transfer counter-narcotics operations, for 
which the military were responsible, to the Federal Police. Dilma moved ABIN, the 
national intelligence agency, from the aegis of the Ministry of Defence and the 
National Security Office within the President’s office, to which it had answered since 
its creation in 1999, and subordinated it to SENASP. This was prompted by 
intelligence officials irritated at having to answer to military officials, and a sense that 
ABIN had become too autonomous. Yet, the armed forces retained wider influence in 
public security as Cardoso amended the Constitution to accord the military a backup 
role in domestic policing (‘to guarantee law and order’), a remit further entrenched 
under Lula, and used as the advance guard of the police pacification units (Unidades 
de Policiamento Pacificadora, UPPs) operating in some of the most violent and drug-
ridden favelas in Rio de Janeiro (Macaulay 2012b). 
The Lula government also encouraged the consolidation of a competitor to the 
armed forces, the Federal Police. Justice Minister Bastos aspired to creating a 
“Brazilian FBI’, so appointed a federal police officer as SENASP head and 
transformed a rather fragmented body riven by internal disputes into one bolstered by 
a wider remit, greater autonomy, a new career structure, and resources, as its staff 
grew by over a third between 2001-08 (Arantes 2011). This newly emboldened 
Federal Police earned public approval for its tenacious, high-profile investigations of 
corrupt politicians and bureaucrats, carrying out 2,226 in the twelve years of the 
Lula/Dilma administration, compared to 48 under Cardoso.  
It was much harder, however, for any of these presidents to reform the state-
level police, as this requires both a constitutional amendment and their corporate 
support. Through the 1990s human rights advocates had argued for the 
demilitarization of the police. But attempts by the Cardoso government to bring 
abuses by military police under the jurisdiction of civilian courts failed due to their 
proxies in Congress, such as former governors in the Senate who took their side. The 
Lula government, instead of trying to merge the civil and military police or 
demilitarize the latter, introduced the Unified Public Security System. This required 
support from the main stakeholders and in 2009 the first ever national conference on 
public security was held. But by contrast to national conferences on human rights 
sponsored by both the Cardoso and Lula governments that had attracted such high 
civil society participation, it was a disaster. The President had no clear position on the 
desired reform outcome, and so the executive branch itself was divided. On the one 
side was SENASP head, Ricardo Ballestreri, an advocate of the “single cycle” (ciclo 
único) which would maintain the institutional but not the functional division between 
the police forces: both would arrest suspects and investigate crimes, with the Civil 
Police dealing with the more complex ones. However, the National Secretary of 
Justice, Romeu Tuma Jr, a former civil police detective, disagreed and was backed by 
police unions and senior officials in the Ministry, whilst in Congress another former 
police detective, a PSDB federal deputy, rallied opposition (Souza, 2015: 202-212). 
Thus lack of presidential preference allowed representatives of the producers of 
public security to veto an historic opportunity. The Lula administration was then 
forced to take a more pragmatic line, using task forces to set up “Integrated 
Management Cabinets” in each state to help the two police forces work together 
operationally without touching their institutional structure. His original proposal was 
to set up a full-scale Ministry for Public Security, but this he quickly discarded as too 
politically costly. However, ironically, it has now been taken up as a banner by the 
counter-reformist political opposition. 
 
Intergovernmental relations: a new federative pact? 
During these three administrations the Ministry of Justice was the president’s chief 
interface with the subnational units of government. Another key role for the president 
is to manage intergovernmental relations to ensure that policies are actually delivered 
at the lower levels of government. Their ability to do so is conditioned by both 
political and institutional factors. Brazil is unusual in combining a highly centralized 
legal framework with a strongly federal system of government. Penal law and 
procedure, as with other areas of law, are unitary, legislated at national level, and 
applied across the entire country. Although the over-arching institutional architecture 
of the criminal justice systems of the 26 states and the federal district is virtually 
identical, the day-to-day management of the courts, public prosecutorial service, 
police and prison services is decentralized and delegated to the state-level political 
authorities. Setting out a new “federative pact” in public security, that is, persuading 
sub-national actors, especially the state governors and heads of public security, to 
adhere to national guidelines, has been a slow and contested process of punctuated 
equilibrium (Fórum Brasileira de Segurança Pública 2010).  
The issues at state level concern primarily the political control of the police, 
which are powerful local corporations, compete for influence among themselves and 
capable of resistance to imposed change (Soares 2000). Different security sector and 
justice institutions can influence policy through the state secretariats for public 
security (SSP). In the early years of the transition to democracy governors frequently 
appointed retired military officers or military police officers to head these. However, 
during the first Lula governments, from 2003-2008, Federal Police officials began to 
displaced the military, heading up 16 of the 27 SSPs, 14 of which were run by 
governors linked to the governing coalition.
4
 They were seen as more technically 
competent, less politicized (and less amenable to being used politically by the 
governor) ,and unconnected to the state-level civil and military police, thus above 




corporatist interests or local institutional corruption. Given the ever increasing 
amounts of resources that the Lula government was making available to the states, 
governors also anticipated a direct channel to the Ministry of Justice and SENASP. As 
the Federal Police officials very well versed in the precepts of SENASP, these 
appointments resulted in a quiet, de facto federalization of law-and-order policy. 
However, the backlash against the centre-left consensus meant that in 2015 only eight 
governors appointed Federal Police officials to head their SSPs.  
There are few levers that the federal government can use in relation to the 
subnational units beyond finance. Reformers during the Cardoso years often 
complained that the government produced excellent guidelines on human rights and 
law-and-order, but was reluctant to use conditionality, withholding funds from states 
with higher levels of police brutality. Cardoso’s other political concerns - to get 
political support for re-election, and hold the economy steady - meant he needed as 
many local caciques as he could get. His Justice Minister Miguel Reale Jr resigned 
when Cardoso refused his request for federal intervention in the state of Espírito 
Santo due to persistent death squad activity there involving both political and criminal 
justice actors, because it was governed by an ally. The delicacies of state-federal 
relations and party competition meant that when the PCC riots broke out in São Paulo, 
Lula’s offer of federal assistance was turned down by the PSDB governor.  
However, federal spending could be used as a carrot as well as stick, and 
expenditure on public security took off from 1999 and climbed steadily through the 
Lula years. His Minister of Justice, Tarso Genro, created a major new programme, the 
National Programme of Public Security with Citizenship (Programa Nacional de 
Segurança Pública com Cidadania, PRONASCI) which was backed up by a 
presidential decree and a pledge to invest R$6.707 billion by 2012. Like the National 
Plan, its 94 proposed areas of activity were to be delivered through horizontal multi-
agency action (involving 19 ministries) and vertical state-municipal initiatives. By 
building relationships directly with those municipalities most affected by violent 
crime, the federal government effectively bypassed the states, which posed the 
greatest political difficulty in terms of the governors” potential resistance and local 
stakeholder groups such as police unions.  
This meant that at one point it was the municipalities and federal government, 
not the states, investing the most in public security. The marked increase in spending 
came after 2003 when a change in the legislation regulating the National Public 
Security Fund allowed the federal government to channel funds directly to 
municipalities for the purpose of violence and crime prevention. The PRONASCI 
programme transferred R$200 million a year (originally intended for the 12 most 
crime-ridden metropolitan regions in the country, but later spread over 200 cities). 
Cities have also invested far beyond what the law obliges them to: mayors have 
reaped a direct electoral benefit in tackling crime and insecurity about which the 
governors and federal authorities were sceptical for a long time (FSBP, 2010: 7). Of 
5,565 municipalities, by 2012 some 993 had a Municipal Guard and 1,273 had some 
municipal body dealing with law-and-order.
5
 
Despite these pragmatic policies, the ability of the federal government to drive 
law-and-order policy continues to encounter a range of political difficulties created by 
the unique contours of Brazilian coalition government and federalism. In some states 
the political establishment, and many criminal justice actors, are involved in 
organized crime networks, with no incentive to extricate themselves. Newer political 
actors are also finding that there are votes in law-and-order, particularly as the 
pendulum is swinging to a harder-line discourse. 
 
Coalition and opposition management: pork and producer capture 
The three presidents and their Ministry of Justice appointees also had to deal 
with Congress, managing their own coalition to pass important legislation and 
reducing the space for the opposition to veto or overturn bills, or to push their own 
agenda. Law-and-order legislation can be informed different motivations, from a 
political/ideological commitment to a certain direction of penal policy, electoral 
considerations, simple individual or corporate self-interest or a mix of all these. One 
of the key tools in the presidential toolbox is pork, that is, the preferential allocation 
of public resources to political allies of the government, especially at state-level. The 
policy area of law-and-order provides plenty of opportunities for pork-barrel politics 
and individual rent-seeking and enrichment. Firstly, the direct budgetary spend on 
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 Source: IBGE ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Perfil_Municipios/2012/pdf/tab035.pdf 
law-and-order increased dramatically over these three presidencies, with the biggest 
rise in the Lula governments. In 2003 the federal government, state governments and 
municipalities together spent R$22.5 billion, which doubled to R$47.6 billion by 
2009. This was spent on infrastructure such as police stations and prisons, police 
training and tertiary level study, equipment from vehicles to weapons and uniforms, 
technology, salaries and so forth, all of which could give an electoral boost to local 
politicians. Although the shrinking economy meant that Dilma’s governments spent a 




There are also considerable private sector interests at stake. Brazil is the 
second largest producer of small arms, mainly handguns, in the world, with an 
estimated annual value of U$100 million (Dreyfus et al 2010). Most are exported but 
the domestic market was depressed by the Lula government’s 2003 Disarmament 
Statute, which allowed only justice officials or authorized private security agents to 
carry firearms. Just before it passed, nearly 60,000 people a year bought guns: this 
dropped to 37,000 six years later (IPEA 2013). The private security sector has also 
boomed, due to the rise in crime (especially organized crime such as cargo theft), and 
the deficiencies in policing. In 2003 there were 1,400 private security companies, 
many set up by, or employing, police officers: this had nearly doubled to 2,300 in 
2014. Turnover in 2003 was R$10.4 billion, up to R$46 billion in 2014, and rising at 
around 6% per annum.
7
 These same companies are also expanding their portfolios 
into prison privatization, bidding for prison building or management contracts.  
The “bullet bench” 
Contests over law-and-order policy are also ideological, although this is rarely 
party-political per se. The differences between the Cardoso, Lula and Dilma 
administrations lay more in their governance abilities than any substantive 
disagreement for the PSDB and PT shared a broad liberal, centrist consensus about 
human rights and civil liberties protection (what is termed garantismo) whereas the 
right-wing view (distributed across representatives of many different parties) argues 
that society must be protected, at all costs, by the state security apparatus (the defesa 
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 All data from the Brazilian Forum on Public Security 
7
 Data from FENAVIST – National Federation for Security and Armoured Transport.  
social perspective). The latter view has been articulated through a law-and-order 
lobby of some kind in Congress since 1990, its power determined by both presidential 
and party-system strength. The Collor and Franco governments were disorganized 
presidential coalitions and this lobby had space to operate in a Congress in which 
there was no dominant party linked to the President. It was thus easier to push through 
punitivist legislation such as the Heinous Crime bill, passed rapidly following a wave 
of kidnappings in 1990, and was revised in 1994 following the murder of a famous 
actress. This space was reduced during the Cardoso and Lula years who were much 
stronger coalition managers, and in such circumstances it was able to act only as a 
veto-player. It returned as a more pro-active and organized force as the party system 
fragmented further, going from 22 parties elected to Congress in 2010 to 28 in 2014. 
President Dilma’s Workers” Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) controlled only 
14per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and as her coalition crumbled, 
cross-bench groupings began to drive the legislative agenda. 
With entry to such a weak party system dependent largely on a candidate’s 
individual resources such as money, social and professional networks, and access to 
mass media, the lobbying influence of private security providers and gun 
manufacturers grew steadily in Congress. The collective term “bullet caucus” 
(bancada da bala) is used, minimally, to denote those politicians who have received 
campaign finance from these commercial interests. In 2010, they were able to elected 
32 senators and federal deputies, with campaign contributions totalling R$1.5 
million.
8
 In the 2014 elections R$1.91 million was donated to 21 candidates for 
federal deputy, 12 for state deputy, two gubernatorial hopefuls and a candidate for the 
Senate. The return to investment was impressive: 18 of the candidates for federal 
deputy were elected directly, the other three elected as stand-ins. Fully half came from 
the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, where the majority of gun and munitions 
manufacturers are located. 
The term bancada da bala is also used to include the former police officers 
elected to legislative office, and those who broadly sympathise with their aims (these 
may include individuals who have been personally affected by crime, or who have an 
ideological position on crime and punishment. The numbers of former police officers 
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elected to the Chamber of Deputies was relatively stable (seven in 2002 and in 2006, 
four in 2010), but shot up in 2014 to 19. Representatives such as “Delegado” Waldir, 
a civil police officer, emerged as the highest voted deputies in their states as a result 
of penal populist campaigns and the open list electoral system. Thus the pork-barrel 
chain whereby career politicians act as intermediaries for the business interests in 
their district has been short circuited by public security officials seeking to represent 
directly their own individual and corporate interests, such as the institutional 
autonomy of distinct police forces, impunity and protection from scrutiny, career 
structures and perks, and budgetary allocations to those services. Similarly, they are 
no longer using proxies (retired governors in the Senate) to support their position, but 
entering the political arena to do so themselves. The bancada da bala’s roots also lie 
in the state police strikes of the 1990s, and the formation of local police unions, 
representing not just individual forces, but categories within them. They began to 
mobilise to elect members to municipal and state legislatures, resulting in a 
progressive “police-ization” of the country’s legislative arena, which had enabled 
local bancadas da bala to work in the spaces of coalitional gubernatorialism and 
mayorism, veto-playing and agenda-setting around law-and-order and human rights. 
São Paulo city council has had a bancada da bala for several mandates. This 
intensified under the PT presidencies: in the municipal elections of 2008, across the 
country 4,144 civil and military police officers ran for office, compared to 3,886 in 
2004.
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 It also helped prepare the ground for those running for the National Congress. 
Bancadas function like informal identity and affinity groups, or advocacy 
coalitions in Congress, However, there are also much wider, formally constituted, 
policy communities, the issue-specific “fronts’. The Frente Parlamentar on Public 
Security has 240 signatories from across the political spectrum but it is clearly 
dominated by the key members of the bancada da bala. The bancadas drive the ideas; 
the frentes mobilise the votes. The second Dilma administration saw a change in 
behaviour by the bancadas and frentes, as they joined forces in a grand anti-
government coalition led by Speaker of the House, Eduardo Cunha. The bancada da 
bala, the bancada evangélica (Neo-Pentecostals), and the bancada ruralista 
(landowners) acted in concert in the so-called bancada BBB (standing for “bíblia, boi 
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and bala” – “bible, beef and bullet’), lending votes to one another to get their 
individual agendas passed, and to form a cross-party opposition. Indeed, 313 out of 
the 367 deputies that voted to initiate impeachment proceedings against Dilma were 
members of one of the associated frentes, and 53 were members of all three. 
As the President lost control of her coalition, and thus of agenda-setting spaces 
in Congress, the union of the three main cross-party bancadas ensured the election of 
Cunha as leader of the house. They also captured key committees, which the PT 
seemed to have abandoned, and thus could not use to defend the government’s 
agenda. For example, in the past any Parliamentary Committee on Inquiry (CPI) into 
the prison system would, like the standing Committee on Human Rights, have been 
the domain of the PT and other centre-left parties. However, the 2015 CPI on the 
prison system was chaired by retired Military Police Colonel Alberto Fraga, the 
bancada da bala’s leading light. The committee invited private security providers to 
give evidence and, unsurprisingly the final report enthusiastically advocated more 
public-private partnerships and privatization. 
The Committee on Public Security and Organized Crime is an even more 
important agenda-setting arena, due to its filtering function: in 2013 it received 246 
bills but considered only 88. Yet since 2007 the chairs and rapporteurs of most bills 
have been representatives from the opposition, not from the governing coalition’s two 
largest parties (the PT and PMDB). It is not considered a high priority committee as it 
is one of only two that allows its members to sit on other committees. One fifth of its 
members were financed by the firearms and munitions industry and thus had a 
conflict of interest, whilst eight out of the 20 were facing ongoing criminal charges 
linked to electoral misconduct. Half of its members in 2013 were lawyers, former 
police chiefs and army reservists. The problem was that half of the bills considered by 
the committee concerned police salaries, benefits and equipment, that is, corporate 
concerns. The next largest category of bills concerned penal toughening, increasing 
sentences and incarceration. Very few bills dealt with prevention or structural issues 
in the criminal justice system (Instituto Sou da Paz 2014).  
The bancada da bala had by this point developed its own agenda, and 
mobilized the votes of the bancada BBB through the Speaker, Cunha. It first took on 
the age of criminal responsibility, set at 18 in Brazil in line with the Statute on 
Children and Adolescents, which follows the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Children. The first proposed constitutional amendment to lower the age 
had been tabled by a federal deputy back in 1993. This was picked up in April 2015 
by a specially constituted committee, and approved by this and the house standing 
committee on justice and constitutional affairs, both by now dominated by members 
of the bancada da bala. Put speedily to plenary vote in July 2015, the bill failed 
narrowly, gaining only 303 votes instead the 308 required. But twenty-four hours later 
the Speaker sent it back, ‘amended’, for another vote: this time it passed with 323 
votes in the first round, and 320 in the second round (Lino 2016). Like the bancada 
itself, this policy reversal had both ideological and rent-seeking elements. The 
decision means new prisons will have to be built specifically for offenders aged 16-18 
and Brazilian companies involved in private prison management had already an eye to 
future contracts. In the 2014 elections Umanizzare Prison Management, which runs 
six prisons in Amazonas and two in Tocantins, shelled out R$750,000 in campaign 
contributions to Federal Deputy Silas Camara (AM) and his wife and daughter, 
10
 and 
he received a further R$400,000 from two security firms specialized in armed escort 
services. 
The bancada’s second priority was to overturn the Disarmament Statute which 
had passed in Lula’s presidential honeymoon period in 2003. However, the 
subsequent 2005 referendum to prohibit sales of firearms failed with an opposition 
vote of 65%, partly a protest vote against the breaking mensalão scandal. Thus the 
very political tool the President had chosen for governability in coalitional 
presidentialism scuppered this important violence-reduction policy. It also galvanised 
the small arms industry and bancada da bala, who had reframed the issue as the 
citizen’s right to self-defence in the face of incompetent policing. In the mean time 
some 40 bills had put forward in Congress to amend the Statute. In October 2015 a 
special Committee was established in the Chamber of Deputies, again dominated by 
the bancada da bala, and the Statute was revoked, liberalising gun ownership.  
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Conclusions  
This article has analysed the difficulties experienced by three consecutive 
centre-left presidents in Brazil in pushing through an effective policy agenda on law-
and-order. All three shared a broad understanding that insecurity was best tackled by 
ensuring basic human rights (Cardoso, in particular, built up a national human rights 
architecture), increasing accountability within, and executive control over, in the 
repressive institutions of the state, and preferring prevention and alternatives to 
incarceration as a penal response. However, although none of the Presidents was a 
penal populist, other political actors in the system such as state governors and 
candidates for Congress were also aware of the electoral rewards of a tough-on-crime 
stance, and often tugged policy in the opposition direction. In addition, the political 
and strategic demands of coalitional presidentialism also had directly negative effects 
on policy initiatives on law-and-order. The need to maintain political alliances with 
governors stopped the federal government intervening in catastrophic local security 
situations. The PT’s strategy for winning the presidency required a campaign slush-
fund, knowledge of which toppled a key reformer in the Ministry of Justice. The 
scandal over Lula’s main governance tool, the mensalão, scuppered the referendum to 
restrict firearms, and thus gave succour to the gun manufacturers and bancada da 
bala.  
What tools can a president use, then, to get around producer capture in the area 
of law-and-order, which is not unique to Brazil? The personal authority of the 
president plays a considerable role: this enabled Cardoso to pass some key human 
rights legislation, and for Lula to get through the Disarmament Statute. This authority 
was also combined with governing coalitions of high coalescence. Removing certain 
actors from the bureaucratic field proved a successful move, as all three reduced the 
direct influence of the armed forces on law-and-order policy. However, producer 
groups remained powerful actors in the federated system, protected by the difficulty 
of reaching the threshold for passing constitutional amendments in a multiparty 
system, and the autonomy of subnational units of government. Coalitional 
presidentialism is a very suboptimal system of government when the president lacks 
personal authority, her party has lost critical mass in the legislature, and the parties 
both inside and outside the coalition have proliferated and become meaningless labels, 
enabling the parties and key posts to be captured by producer groups with ambitions 
for direct self-interest representation. This has, unfortunately, given free rein to a 
resurgent penal populism that threatens to roll back many of the hard-won law-and-
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